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Timothy Shanahan

The First Moment of

Scientific Inquiry: C. S. Peirce
on the Logic of Abduction
I. Introduction

C. F. Delaney has suggested that the first or abductive phase of
Peirce 's general characterization of scientific method can be distinguished into two "moments." The first is concerned with the original
generation of those hypotheses which will form the set of potential

explanations for the phenomena under consideration, and is a function of the creative imagination of some (gifted) individuals. As such
it cannot be reduced to strict formulae or procedural rules. The second
moment is concerned with the preferential ordering of the hypotheses

in this set in relation to considerations bearing on the economy of re-

search. This moment of the abductive phase is rule-governed, with

features such as "simplicity" supplying the requisite selectory criteria.1 This distinction is a useful one for coming to understand
more fully Peirce 's account of the abductive phase of inquiry in relation to the grounds of validity undergirding the scientific enterprise
as he conceives it.

While Delaney's paper deals primarily (though not exclusively)
with the second moment, the present paper focusses especially on
the first moment, which is used as a point of departure for a more
wide-ranging investigation of some of the characteristic features
of Peirce 's thought related to his philosophies of mind and nature.
Following a brief review of Peirce 's general theory of the stages of
scientific inquiry, we proceed to examine his view of the role and
importance of the abductive phase within the scientific enterprise.
He thinks that this phase rests ultimately upon a particular faculty
or instinct man possesses which permits him a certain insight into
the most general structural features of nature. Since the scientific
enterprise as he conceives it rests ultimately upon this faculty, it is

appropriate to inquire further into the grounds of its validity. We
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shall suggest that Peirce offers at least three distinct explanatory
accounts of this faculty. After discussing each of these accounts
individually, we shall suggest how they can be seen as representing
characteristic features of Peirce 's distinctive approach to human know-

ledge. The working assumption throughout this paper will be that
Peirce is an important philosopher whose often enigmatic remarks
are nonetheless worth taking seriously. Such an attitude would seem
to entail not only accurately presenting ideas from his various avail-

able papers, but also attempting to draw together and relate some
of these ideas to one another, to organize them in some fashion, in a
way that he himself never did, in order to render explicit the poten-

tial unity and coherence of his thought. Rather than treating his
scattered remarks as haphazard and unrelated to one another, there-

fore, they will be seen as distinct threads woven into the fabric of
his unified philosophy.

II. The Logic of Abduction
SI. Peirce's General Theory of Scientific Inquiry

While our primary concern is with Peirce's understanding of the
logical validity of the first moment of the abductive phase of inquiry,
it may not be amiss to begin by situating the abductive phase within
his general theory of the stages of scientific inquiry. As noted above,

the abductive phase could be considered the first stage of scientific
inquiry inasmuch as it is concerned with the original generation and

recommendation of explanatory hypotheses, i.e., with the positing
of specific laws to account for the observed phenomena under consideration. We shall have more to say about this stage in the next

section. Peirce terms the second stage "Deduction" in which the
hypothesis selected is examined and its consequences are derived. Like
the first stage, the second stage also has two parts. The first part consists in logical analysis to explicate the hypothesis and to render it as

perfectly distinct as possible. "Explication" is followed by "Demonstration", wherein the inquirer considers more closely the consider-

ations already introduced or involved in the Explication in order to

derive its experiential consequents. Deduction having been sufficiently carried out, "the inquiry enters upon its Third Stage, that of
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ascertaining how far those consequents accord with experience, and
of judging whether the hypothesis is sensibly correct, or requires some

inessential modification, or must be entirely rejected" (6.472). 2 He
divides this third or inductive stage into three parts. In "Classification"

general ideas are attached to objects of experience; in the "Probations" these ideas are tested with respect to the experiential conse-

quents; and in the "Sentential" part of the Inductive stage the inquirer "appraises the different Probations singly, then their combinations, then makes self-appraisal of these very appraisals themselves,

and passes final judgment on the whole result" (6.472). ^ This sketch
of the three stages of inquiry, while omitting many important details,

may nonetheless be sufficient to contextualize the abductive phase
within Peirce 's more general theory of scientific inquiry. With this

as background, we might now turn our attention more fully to his
account of the First Stage.
S2. The Abductive Phase

One of Peirce 's central concerns in developing his distinctive philosophy of science is with the nature of the logical validity possessed

by each of the three stages he discusses. He believes that Kant correctly analyzed the validity of Deduction. The fact that, "This kind
of reasoning deals exclusively with Pure Ideas attaching primarily to
Symbols and derivatively to other Signs of our own creation," Peirce

thinks, plus "the fact that man has a power of Explicating his own
meaning renders Deduction valid" (6.474). "Induction," on the other
hand, "is a kind of reasoning that may lead us into error." Yet, it
follows a kind of method which, if sufficiently persisted in, will lead

to Inductive Certainty. The decisive question of the "logical Critic",
then, is "What sort of validity can be attributed to the First Stage of
Inquiry?" Clearly, given its foremost position in the series of stages

Peirce outlines, its justification becomes crucial. Peirce begins his
answer by precisely identifying the peculiar importance of this stage
in the overall project of scientific inquiry:

Observe that neither Deduction nor Induction contributes
the smallest positive item to the final conclusion of the in-
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quiry. They render the indefinite definite; Deduction explicates; Induction evaluates; that is all. Over the chasm that

yawns between the ultimate goal of science and such ideas
of Man's environment as, coming over him during his primeval wanderings in the forest, while yet his very notion of

error was of the vaguest, he managed to communicate to
some fellow, we are building a cantilever bridge of induction,

held together by scientific struts and ties. Yet every plank

of its advance is first laid by [abduction]^ alone . . . and
neither Deduction nor Induction contributes a single new
concept to the structure." (6.475)

The problem, then, is the logical validation of those hypotheses
which constitute the initial introduction of propositional content into
the scientific inquiry. It is clear that without the justificatory ground-

ing of these hypotheses, the conclusions of the second and third stages
of inquiry are also cast in doubt, and the edifice of science is set upon

a foundation of questionable legitimacy whose conclusions are no
better.

The problem here is not unlike that faced by Aristotle in developing

his own demonstrative philosophy of science. In order to stay an
infinite regress in the order of demonstration, it was necessary to
secure premises which were not themsleves the conclusions of logically

prior demonstrations. Aristotle's solution to this problem was to say

that since scientific knowledge was clearly possible, that man must
possess a faculty of epagoge or intuitive insight into the first principles

requisite for a scientific demonstration. Furthermore, the premises
thus secured must be certain. Without such an assumption, scientific
knowledge and progress would be simply inexplicable.5

Peirce faces a somewhat similar problem in justifying the initial
elements of scientific reasoning as he understands it. His solution to

his own problem is not unlike Aristotle's, in the sense that he too
insists that there must be access to some basic premises from which
to proceed if scientific knowledge is to be attainable. Or, at the very
least, the philosopher of science must assume that there is such access:
"The only justification possible, ... is the justification of desperation.
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That is to say, that if he is not to say such things, he will be quite

unable to know anything of positive fact" (5.603). But in keeping
with his own avowed fallibilism, Peirce readily concedes that even
though we are forced to assume that we have access to such basic
premises when engaged in scientific inquiry, still we are not to con-

sider such premises as immutable or as absolutely certain. Rather,
"we try them, we compare them with experience, we hold ourselves

ready to throw them overboard at a moment's notice from exper-

ience" (1.634). Indeed, he thinks that the initial hypotheses, "are
so mixed up with error that they can never be trusted till they have

been corrected by experiment" (1.404). Clearly for Peirce the abductive phrase does not stand alone in the scientific project, since its
products are always responsible to the critical elaboration and evaluation of the other two stages.

Although he begins his discussion of the validity of abduction with

the kind of transcendental justification sketched above, he is also
convinced that certain quasi-historical considerations are antecedent
and lend support to such an account: "There is a reason, an interpretation, a logic, in the course of scientific advance, and this indisputably proves to him who has perceptions of rational or significant relations, that man's mind must have been attuned to the truth of things

in order to discover what he has discovered. It is the very bedrock of

logical truth" (6.476). What he seems to be most struck by is not
simply the static fact of scientific knowledge, nor even our present

advanced state of scientific knowledge, but rather the tremendous
progress science has made in the relatively brief period in which man

has existed. Such progress would be simply inexplicable apart from

the assumption of some special faculty associated with the human
mind, since, "Nature is a far vaster and less clearly arranged reper-

tory of facts than a census report; and if men had not come to it
with special aptitudes for guessing right, it may well be doubted whether in the ten or twenty thousand years that they may have existed

their greatest mind would have attained the amount of knowledge
which is actually possessed by the lowest idiot" (2.753).
Besides the fact that there must be postulated this special aptitude
for guessing right if the rapid progress of science is to be accounted
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for, Peirce also offers a more properly historical argument in support
of this view. In particular, he thinks that a brief perusal of the history of science will bear him out in his belief that such an aptitude has

in fact been crucially operative in the work of some of the most original and important scientists:

In examining the reasonings of those physicists who gave
to modern science the initial propulsion which has insured
its healthful life ever since, we are struck with the great,

though not absolutely decisive, weight they allowed to
instinctive judgments. Galileo appeals to il lume naturale
at the most critical stages of his reasoning. Kepler, Gilbert, and Harvey - not to speak of Copernicus - substantially rely upon an inward power, not sufficient to reach
the truth by itself, but yet supplying an essential factor to

the influences carrying their minds to the truth. (1.80;
cf. 5.591)
By "the truth" Peirce is referring to the natural laws, the discovery

of which constitutes the major achievement of each of the scientists
mentioned. If we are to account for the meteoric progress of science

conceived as the investigation into the laws which govern natural
phenomena, then the proposed mental faculty of "guessing right"
must be one which associates the human mind with the natural laws

which constitute the formally objective features of nature. That is
to say, there must be a "fit" of some sort between the human cognizer and the nomological phenomena science is continually disclosing;
for without such a fit the first stage (and hence both other stages) of

scientific inquiry, could never be logically validated: "It is certain
that the only hope of [abductive] reasoning ever reaching the truth
is that there may be some natural tendency toward an agreement be-

tween the ideas which suggest themselves to the human mind and

those which are concerned in the laws of nature" (1.81; cf. 2.753;

1.121; 2.86; 5.604; 6.531; 7.38; 7.680). Having thus emphasized
both the need and the apparent historical reality of such an agreement, the first moment of the abductive phase has been given at least
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a prima facie justification in terms of a proposed faculty correlating
the human mind and the laws of nature. The next step in the logical
validation of the first moment would be to explicate the origination
of this ability in more detail, perhaps by providing a genetic explana-

tion of some sort. The notion of 'instinct' provides Peirce with a
useful general account of what he has in mind, and it is to this account
that we now turn.
S3. The Instinctual Basis of Abduction

Peirce 's initial strategy is to characterize this ability as a species of
Insight into the general or law-like elements in nature which, though

"not strong enough to be oftener right than wrong," nonetheless is

"strong enough not to be overwhelmingly more often wrong than
right" (5.173). Despite the fair amount of reliability he apparently
attributes to this insight, he stresses that, "it has certainly not been
[acquired] by a self-controlled and critical logic." Rather, "it is to be
referred to the same general class of operations to which Perceptive

Judgments belong" (5.173). The "same general class to which Perceptive Judgments belong" is presumably the class of those faculties

which operate naturally and pre-critically to provide the organism
with important information about its immediate environment. Yet
such insight is not identical with perceptual judgment, since it "is at

the same time of the general nature of Instinct, resembling the in-

stincts of the animal in its so far surpassing the general powers of
our reason and for its directing us as if we were in possession of facts

that are entirely beyond the reach of our senses" (5.173; emphasis
added). Reason is able to draw connections between ideas, and our
perceptual faculties are able to provide information about the immediate sensory environment; but instinct provides, as it were, a rule
for acting applicable to all conditions sufficiently similar to those in
which the organism has developed. Before proceeding to discuss how

this instinctual ability functions in the first moment of abduction,
i.e.. in hypothesis generation, it might be useful to pause here in order
to explain briefly what he understands by the term 'instinct*.

Peirce defines an 'animal instinct' as "a natural disposition, or
inborn determination of the individual's Nature (his 'nature' being

456 Timothy Shanahan

that within him which causes his behaviour to be such as it is), mani-

fested by a certain unity of quasi-purpose in his behaviour" (7.381,

n.19). In man, however, "this behaviour is always conscious" and
(barring extraordinary stress) is "always partially controlled by the
deliberative exercise of imagination and reflexion. " The question
that naturally arises here is, how is this understanding of human instinct

to be squared with his own earlier claim that the faculty of Insight
responsible for abduction has not been acquired by a "self-contolled and critical logic"? The important distinction to take note of

in this context is that between the primitive acquisition of this ability and one's present awareness of its operation. While the ability
was originally acquired non-deliberately and non-reflectively, it now
functions at least partially on the deliberative and reflective level of

consciousness. It is neither wholly non-rational nor wholly spontaneous. Rather, on the one hand, "to the man himself the instinctual

action appears to be entirely rational." But on the other hand, "the
adaptation of the behaviour to its quasi-purpose in some definite
part overleaps all control" (ibid.), Peirce's understanding of human
instinct thus has three essential features: (i) "it is conscious," (ii)
it "is determined to a quasi-purpose," and (iii) "in definite respects
it escapes all control" (ibid.). But if Peirce wishes to explain hypothesis generation in terms of a certain instinct as above specified, we
should still want to know how this instinct itself is to be accounted

for. Our next concern, therefore, is to consider how he explains
such an instinct in the first place. Actually he offers three distinct
explanations for this instinctual ability to non-discursively grasp the

general nomological features of reality, each of which we will examine in turn.

S4. The Argument from Adaptive Value

In the first place, Peirce thinks that this particular instinct, like
every other instinct possessed by animals, can be explained in virtue

of a certain adaptive value associated with it: "It seems incontestable, therefore, that the mind of man is strongly adapted to the comprehension of the world; at least, so far as this goes, that certain conceptions, highly important for such a comprehension, naturally arise
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in his mind; and, without such a tendency, the mind could never

have had any development at all" (6.417). The idea here seems to
be that if not the comprehension of the world embodied in actual
propositions expressing laws of nature, then at least certain "conceptions" highly important for such a comprehension, arise naturally

in human consciousness. And such conceptions are here held to be
necessary prerequisites for arriving at any further conceptions or com-

plexes of conceptions, i.e., propositons. The emphasis here is on
the general conceptions which constitute the primary adaptive orientation of the human mind to the world.

Not surprisingly, perhaps, the "Kantist" Peirce mentions specifically

such general conceptions as time, space, and force. He then proceeds to suggest an explanation for the possession of such conceptions
in terms of their adaptive value: "The great utility and indispensableness of the conceptions of time, space, and force, even to the lowest
intelligence, are such as to suggest that they are the results of natural
selection. Without something like geometrical, kinetical, and mechanical conceptions, no animal could seize his food or do anything which

might be necessarry for the preservation of the species" (6.418).
True, an animal might be endowed with an instinct which served essentially the same purpose, that is, which functioned fairly well given
the animal's characteristic habitat, though it made no use of the con-

ceptions of time, space, and force. "But, as that animal would have
an immense advantage in the struggle for life whose mechanical conceptions did not break down in a novel situation (such as development

must bring about), there would be a constant selection in favor of
more and more correct ideas of these matters" (6.418; cf. 4.91, 1.118,

5.45,5.586,5.591).
It is important to note here that Peirce is framing his explanation
simply in terms of the mechanics of natural selection. The very general conceptions that he wants to attribute adaptive value to are geared

toward helping an animal perform efficiently such behaviors as are

necessary to maintain it and its species in existence. He is even
willing to admit that such conceptions are not strictly speaking necessary to an animal's survival, so long as the animal has some alternative
conceptions which allow it to manage fairly well in its own particular
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niche. But those animals with a more precise set of mechanical con-

ceptions will have a decided advantage in the struggle for survival
over those lacking such conceptions or instincts.

Of course, Peirce's primary interest is with the functioning of these

instinctual conceptions in man. If greater precision (i.e., nearness
to the "correct ideas of these matters") brings with it greater adaptive/
survival value, then it would seem that there would be a kind of "push"

towards the evolution of certain animals possessing a higher degree
of precision in such conceptions, eventually reaching up from very
general conceptions to a comprehension of fundamental relationships between these conceptions. Enter Scientific Man: "Thus would
be attained the knowledge of that fundamental law upon which all
science rolls; namely, that forces depend upon relations of time, space,
and mass. When this idea was once sufficiently clear, it would require
no more than a comprehensible degree of genius to discover the exact

nature of these relations" (6.418). It would seem on this account
that Newton's discovery of the inverse square law, for instance, was

really, if viewed in the proper perspective, simply a high point in
an evolutionary process which began at least with the beginning of
the human race and, most likely, with the beginning of the universe.

The precision of the concepts and the apprehension of their interrelation were attained through eons of the evolutionary development

of (cosmic?) consciousness. Newton's "comprehensible degree of
genius" was simply "to discover the exact nature of these relations."
But if this is to be our explanation of the discovery of natural laws,

namely, in terms of the adaptive value of the possession of such an

adaptation, we are naturally led to inquire into the degree of adaptive value contributed by such an adaptation. Why should we think
that a knowledge of the laws of classical mechanics, for instance,
rather than simply an apprehension of the basic conceptions of time,

space, and mass and their (rough) interrelations, should contribute
anything at all to an organism's survival fitness? It seems rather

that such knowledge might actually prove a hindrance in a world
in which life depends upon instantaneous behavioral responses to
simple and immediate spatio-temporal stimuli. Peirce himself seems
to have been sensitive to such a difficulty: "Such a hypothesis na-
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turally suggests itself, but it must be admitted that it does not seem
sufficient to account for the extraordinary accuracy with which these

conceptions apply to the phenomena of Nature, and it is probable
that there is some secret here which remains to be discovered" (6.418).
It is possible that he is covertly referring to his own doctrine of "synechism," which is at the basis of another of his explanations for the
validity of the abductive phase.

S5. The Argument from Synechism
The above account, while clearly grounded in some strong Kantian
roots, may suggest, when more fully elaborated, some strikingly He-

gelian consequences. One almost gets the sense that for Peirce the
universe has evolved to a point at which part of the universe is finally
able to reflect upon itself: the universe has finally reached the stage

of Self-Consciousness. This intimacy between the laws of nature
and man's mind is developed further in his next explanation. It is not
surprising, he thinks, that the mind should have this faculty of hitting

upon the correct laws of nature, since the mind itself was formed by
these very laws of nature: "Certain uniformities, that is to say, certain
general ideas of action, prevail throughout the universe, and the reason-

ing mind is itself a product of this universe. These same laws are
thus, by logical necessity, incorporated into [its] own being" (5.603).
Because man's mind has developed under the influence of the laws of

nature, its tendencies are naturally in accord with those laws: "It is

somehow more than a mere figure of speech to say that nature fecundates the mind of man with ideas which, when those ideas grow

up, will resemble their father, Nature." (5.591, 7.39, 7.508, 7.46).
"There can," Peirce states, "be no reasonable doubt that man's mind,
having been developed under the influence of the laws of nature, for
that reason naturally thinks somewhat after nature's pattern" (7.39).

The idea here expressed, it must be admitted, does not strike the
present writer with the kind of luminous self-evidence with which it
apparently struck Peirce. Fortunately, he provides an example which

is intended to make his meaning "tolerably clear." The particular
family of lines called 'straight', he says, has no geometrical properties
distinguishing it from any of the other innumerable families of lines
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of which there is one and only one through any two points. Now
it is a law of dynamics that every dynamical relation between two
points is similar (except in quantity) to every such dynamical relation between any other two points on the same straight line. Consequently a straight line is the shortest distance between two points,
and because of this light appears to move along such lines. This being
the case, we recognize them visually and call them 'straight*. "Thus,
the faculty of sight naturally causes us to assign great prominence to

such lines; and thus when we come to form a hypothesis about the
motion of a particle left uninfluenced by any other, it becomes
natural for us to suppose that it moves in a straight line" (5.603).
Here we have an example of how our perceptual apparatus plays a
significant role in the kind of conceptual principle that will naturally

suggest itself to the inquiring mind. And this, in turn, is simply a
particular instantiation of a more general law operative in the forma-

tion of our minds: "The reason this turns out to be true is, therefore, that this first law of motion is a corollary from a more general
law which, governing all dynamics, governs light, and causes the idea
of straightness to be a predominant one in our minds" (5.603). Peirce
sums up his view by saying:

In this way, general considerations concerning the universe,

strictly philosophical considerations, all but demonstrate

that if the universe conforms, with any approach to accuracy, to certain highly pervasive laws, and if man's mind
has been developed under the influence of those laws, it is
to be expected that he should have a natural light, or light
of nature, or instinctive insight, or genius, tending to make

him guess those laws aright, or nearly aright. This conclusion is confirmed when we find that every species of
animal is endowed with a similar genius. . . . (5.604)

Here again we have the idea that man's ability to "guess aright" the
laws of nature is to be placed on a continuum with the instincts all

animals are endowed with, albeit of a very high order. But he here
links this idea with another which seems to be logically distinct from
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it: that a partial explanation of man's ability to guess aright the laws
of nature is a function of the fact that man's mind, no less than every

other entity existing in nature, has itself been formed by these very
laws. But if nature is essentially material, and the human mind is an

immaterial substance, then how is it that the former can play such
a significant role in the development of the latter? The answer must
be framed in terms of Peirce 's distinctive philosophies of mind and

nature, according to which natural laws are conceived as "habits"
which have become ingrained in the universe, a view which seems
strange at first until it is realized that Peirce views matter and and mind

as simply two poles on a single continuum, with all "material" things

exhibiting some degree of mental activity. "[W]e ought to suppose
a continuity between the characters of mind and matter, so that matter

would be nothing but mind that had such indurated habits as to cause

it to act with a peculiarly high degree of mechanical regularity or
routine" (6.277). This is, in turn, simply a direct consequence of
his doctrine of synechism, according to which, "all that exists is con-

tinuous" (1.172). Given such a doctrine, then "the reaction between
mind and matter would be of no essentially different kind from the

action between parts of the mind that are in continuous union. . ."

(6.277). In this sense it can be said that, "habit is by no means exclusively a mental fact. Empirically, we find that some plants take
habits. The stream of water that wears a bed for itself is forming a

habit" (5.492). Transposing this account into the human realm, it
is as if the highly pervasive general laws of nature, which are themselves

merely "habits" governing effete matter/mind, have left structural
traces or grooves in human consciousness and thought thus naturally

follows the lines laid down in its very fabric: "Thus it is that, our
minds having been formed under the influence of phenomena governed

by the laws of mechanics, certain conceptions entering into those
laws become implanted in our minds, so that we readily guess at what

the laws are" (6.10; cf. 1.118, 5.47, 5.586, 5.591, 5.603). In fact,
Peirce thinks that without such a natural prompting our ability to
discover laws of nature with the precision that we do would be inexplicable.
But actually it is not quite as simple as this; for obviously many of
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the laws of nature physicists discover, besides boasting of a fair degree

of precision, are also highly complex. Think, for example, of the
laws associated with subatomic particles, relativity theory, and so
forth. Peirce admits that, "The further physical studies depart from
phenomena which have directly influenced the growth of the mind,
the less we can expect to find the laws which govern the mind "sim-

ple," that is, composed of a few conceptions natural to our minds"
(6.10). And again, "as we penetrate further and further from the
surface of nature, instinct ceases to give any decided answers; and
if it did, there would no longer be any reason to suppose its answers

approximated to the truth" (6.508, 7.606). How then does he propose to explain the generation of hypotheses associated with the
often highly non-intuitive natural laws that physicists are continually revealing? The answer is perhaps found in an initially unexpected

place.
S6. Laws of Nature and God's Thought
To cover these cases of more complex hypothesis generation it may

be that Peirce has one final explanation at his disposal, allied to the
previous explanation but also significantly different. He gives a brief
hint of it in the following passage:

[E]very scientific explanation of a natural phenomenon
is a hypothesis that there is something in nature to which

the human reason is analogous; and that it really is so
all the successes of science in its applications to human convenience are witnesses. They proclaim that truth over the
length and breadth of the modern world. In the light of the

successes of science to my mind there is a degree of baseness in denying our birthright as children of God and in

shamefacedly slinking away from such anthropomorphic
conceptions of the universe. (1.316)
As in the previous explanations he is claiming a sort of intimacy be-

tween the objective structural features of nature (natural laws and
their conceptual constituents) and the most general cognitive features
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of the human mind (conceptions of space, time, etc. and various relationships thereof), with the latter being explained in terms of the

former. Here he introduces the notion of man's kinship with God
but does not go on to develop how an "anthropomorphic conception
of the universe" constitutes a hypothesis concerning scientific explanations of natural phenomena, beyond suggesting that each such
explanation implies that there is something in nature to which human

reason is "analogous." This could be taken as making the same point

as in the previous explanation. In another passage, however, Peirce
goes farther and is more explicit: "Were I merely asked to grant that

the anticipations of experience involved with (more accurately than

"in") induction cannot be accounted for except by the ancient hypothesis that man has been made in the image of his Maker, so far as

his Reason goes, I should be compelled to admit this" (2.22). And
again, "To believe in a god at all, is not that to believe that man's
reason is allied to the originating principle of the universe?" (2.24)
By "originating principle of the universe" Peirce may be saying
no more than that man discerns the laws of nature originally established

by God, in the sense of apprehending the laws governing natural bodies

as these are directed, mediately or immediately, by God's will. Such
a view might be indistinguishable from any number of familiar models

of divine providence, ranging from deism to occasionalism. But before

we rest content with such a conclusion, we should want to know
what Peirce means by 'God'. Fortunately, he has no qualms about
telling us:

If a pragmatist is asked what he means by the word 'God,'

he can only say that just as long acquaintance with a man
of great character may deeply influence one's whole manner

of conduct, . . . [and] if contemplation and study of the
physico-psychical universe can imbue a man with principles
of conduct analogous to the influence of a great man's works

or conversations, then that analogue of a mind ... is what
he means by 'God' . . . the discoveries of science, their
enabling us to predict what will be the course of nature,
is proof conclusive that, though we cannot think any thought
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of God's, we can catch a fragment of His Thought, as it
were. (6.502)
This passage is striking in its suggestiveness. We have seen that he
compares the relationship between the basic conceptions in human consciousness with the objective general features of reality, i.e., natural

laws. Here he seems to be saying that the scientific discovery of a
natural law is in a sense "catching a fragment of [God's] Thought."
Is he here identifying the objective general features of reality with

the order of the ideas in God's consciousness (or mind)? Such an
interpretation is tempting, especially in the light of his remarks else-

where, for example when he says that: "Analogy suggests that the
laws of nature are ideas or resolutions in the mind of some vast con-

sciousness, who, whether supreme or subordinate, is a Deity relatively

to us" (5.107). This would make God ontologically immanent in nature, however, to a degree to which Peirce, in the light of his various

fairly traditional theological statements, would probably be unwilling to go. He was not a pantheist; God is not identical with nature,

since He does not exist in time and place as finite things do ("But
the God of my theism is not finite. That won't do at all" (8.262).) A
more plausible reading, and one which seems more consonant with
the wording of the above passage, would be to take God in the sense
of a Creator whose thoughts are expressed and displayed in His work.

Presumably God is a rational creator; man is made to God's image;
therefore man has within him the ability to contemplate and intellectually penetrate to some degree the rational plan at work in nature, i.e., God's thoughts expressed in laws of nature. It is not that
the laws of nature simply are God's thought; rather, it is by contem-

plating and becoming intimately acquainted with the natural phenomena governed by laws that we catch a glimmering of God's thought.

And far from being an optional mode of considering the universe re-

served for the pious, Peirce thinks that some such attitude is cognitively necessary for the regulative aim of science. "Nature only
appears intelligible as far as its processes are seen to be like processes

of thought" (3.422; emphasis added). Nature's most intimate secrets
are revealed only to those individual who adopt a certain quasi-reli-
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gious attitude toward it, born of long familiarity with its processes.

The mystic and the natural scientist on this account, are perhaps
closer bed-fellows than it is customary to suppose. Both are making

contact with the same Reality behind the appearances. If the first
moment of scientific inquiry is the initial generation of explanatory
hypotheses, then the last moment may well be the realization of the

ultimate explanation behind the conditions necessary for successful
hypothesis generation in the first place.
III. Conclusion

Our discussion has obviously taken us a long way from our rather
humble initial recognition of two "moments" within Peirce's account

of the abductive phase of scientific inquiry. I have tried to sketch
what appear to be the main strategies he employs in the justification

of this phase. At the same time, an attempt has been made to display some of the conceptual richness of the explanations he brings to

bear on the problem. His solution is at once naturalistic, idealistic,
and theistic. By putting forth arguments drawn from various scientific, philosophic, and theological doctrines, he is able to present
a comprehensive explanation of the foundations of scientific knowl-

edge of astonishing comprehensiveness and power. It is somewhat
doubtful, I think, that Peirce 's account is unproblematic in all of its
details. What is certain, however, is that his account succeeds beautifully in what is perhaps a more vital function: liberating the serious
inquirer, for a time at least, from the rather narrow confines which

too often characterize even philosophical reflection, thus throwing
open the gates to the exploration of more fruitful roads of inquiry.
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NOTES

1. C. F. Delaney, "Peirce on Simplicity* and the Conditions of the
Possibility of Science," in History of Philosophy in the Making, J. L. Thro (ed.)
(Washington University Press of America, 1982), p. 178.

2. All references are to the Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce,
ed. by C. Hartshorne, P. Weiss, and A. W. Burks, 8 vols. (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1931-35, 1958), by volume and paragraph number.

3. The above account follows Peirce's own summary of his doctrine
given in: "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God" (6.468-6.473).

4. For consistency the term 'retroduction' has been replaced with
the synonymous term 'abduction' throughout this paper.

5. See Posterior Analytics, Bk. 1, chaps. 2, 6, 19-21, and Bk. II, chap.
19. Question: Are Peirce's notions of 'Insight' or 'Instinct* functionally similar
to Aristotle's notion of 'Quick Wit' in Bk. II, chap. 34?

